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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OVERVIEW
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cided several cases involving constitutional issues. Some of the cases
cast new light on old problems while others reinforced principles previ-
ously enunciated in settled precedent. Overall, the Tenth Circuit dis-
played a well-balanced approach to upholding the constitutional rights
of the individual, while meeting the legitimate concerns of the govern-
ment and the public. The Tenth Circuit was more protective of substan-
tive due process rights of students in public schools than the United
States Supreme Court in its decision regarding corporal punishment. In
its decisions in other areas, in particular involving the first, fifth, and
fourteenth amendments, the court effectively used precedent to further
develop the law.
Although no new concepts were introduced by the Tenth Circuit in
these cases, they are of interest as illustrations of this circuit's applica-
tion of principles previously discussed and accepted by this and other
circuits. The article which follows is a sampling of the more significant
and interesting cases.
I. THE STANDARD USED TO MAINTAIN SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT
A. Background
1. First Amendment
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "I This command has
two components: the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.
2
The basic purpose of the establishment clause is, in the words of
Thomas Jefferson, to erect "a wall of separation between church and
state." The image of a "wall", however, does not help very much in
determining what types of state actions violate the establishment
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. The establishment clause is applied to the state via
the fourteenth amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1974).
2. The establishment clause and free exercise clause were intended to be "mutually
supportive," vet each works separately to protect distinct liberties. The free exercise
clause seeks to prevent government from acting in a way that intrudes upon the individ-
ual's right to exercise religious beliefs, while the establishment clause is meant to restrain
the government from passing laws favoring a particular religion, thereby placing indirect
pressure upon citizens to adopt a particular belief as their own. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 14-2 (1978).
3. I. JEFFERSON, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 519 (S. PADOVER ed. 1943). See generally
CommentJefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of the Man and the Aleta-
phor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645 (1978).
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clause..
4
The courts presently employ a three-fold test to determine if the
command of neutrality imposed by the establishment clause is violated.5
In order to pass constitutional muster, state action must have a valid
secular purpose, have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, and must avoid fostering an excessive entanglement between
government and religion.6 When an action is challenged under the es-
tablishment clause it must pass all three prongs of this test to be valid.
7
The establishment clause is not merely a command of equal treatment
among religions; the government cannot pass laws which aid one reli-
gion or prefer one religion over another.
8
Despite criticism from commentators9 and members of the Court, 10
the Lemon test remains the yardstick by which state endorsement of reli-
gion is measured. Although the Court has repeated its reluctance to
confine establishment clause analysis to the Lemon test, it officially re-
mains the standard in establishment clause cases.
2. Self-imposed Limitations on Judicial Review
a. Standing
Standing is a threshold inquiry concerned primarily with whether a
litigant's stake or interest in a suit is sufficient for judicial redress. 12 Lit-
igants generally have standing to challenge government action that
4. Comment, Hiding Behind the Wall: Friedman v. Board of County Comm 'rs, 64 DEN. U.L.
REV. 81, 82 (1987).
5. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. Id. at 612-13. What has become known as the Lemon test is really an amalgamation
of the holdings of three cases. The requirement that state action be motivated by a valid
secular purpose was first articulated in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
In that case, the Court upheld a mandatory Sunday closing law, finding that the state was
acting to further the nonreligious goal of assuring a uniform day of rest. In Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), the Court added the requirement that
the effect of state action must neither advance nor inhibit religion. The Court held that a
Pennsylvania statute requiring daily bible readings in public schools had the effect of ad-
vancing religion, and therefore violated the establishment clause. Finally, the rule that
otherwise permissible state action will be invalidated if it fosters excessive entanglement
between government and religion was incorporated into establishment clause analysis in
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970). There the Court upheld a grant of tax-
exempt status to religious institutions. The Court justified its decision by finding that
denial of the exemption would entangle the government in the affairs of religion more
than granting of the exemption.
7. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam).
8. See generally Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9. See Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall of Sepa-
ration or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 15-19; Redlich, Separation of Church and
State: The Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1094, 1122-26 (1985);
Note, Rebuilding the 1Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1473 (1981).
10. See generally Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972) ("Whether a party has
sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that
controversy is what has traditionally been referred to as the question of standing to sue.").
See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-17 (1980).
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would create a judicially cognizable right of action if committed by a
private party. 13 If, however, the plaintiff challenges a government ac-
tion that results in an indirect harm unprotected by a particular legal
interest, such as a government expenditure, standing becomes less
certain. 14
Until 1968, the only Supreme Court decision on whether federal
taxpayers have standing to contest violations of constitutional limits on
Congress' taxing and spending power was Frothingham v. Mellon. 15 In
Frothingham the Supreme Court squarely addressed the question of
whether federal taxpayers have standing to challenge government ex-
penditures. The taxpayer in Frothingham attacked the maternity Act of
1921,16 which provided grants to states engaged in programs to reduce
mother and infant mortality, as an unconstitutional infringement of the
states' tenth amendment rights. 17 Mrs. Frothingham alleged that she
was a taxpayer and in that capacity she was injured because "the effect of
the appropriations complained of will be to increase the burden of fu-
ture taxation and thereby take her property without due process of
law."1 8 The Court held that she lacked standing because her interest in
the moneys of the Treasury is shared with millions of others and "is
comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future
taxation . . .remote ."19
Frothingham barred federal taxpayer suits for forty five years until it
was questioned and partially overcome in Flast v. Cohen. 20 The plaintiff
taxpayers in Flast challenged federal expenditures to aid religious secon-
dary schools. 2 1 Their complaint alleged that the expenditures violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment. 2 2 The Flast majority
first held that the rule of Frothingham was one of judicial self-restraint
and not required by the Constitution, for "we find no absolute bar in
article III to suits by federal taxpayers challenging allegedly unconstitu-
tional federal taxing and spending programs." 2 3 The Court, however,
did not overrule Frothingham; rather it introduced a two-part standing
test, which examined the issues, "to determine whether there is a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudi-
cated. '"24 Applying this test to the federal taxpayers before it, the Court
13. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951).
14. See geverally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13 (4th ed. 1983).
15. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
16. Maternity and Infancy Hygiene Act, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
17. 262 U.S. at 479-80.
18. Id. at 486.
19. Id. at 487-88.
20. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
21. Id. at 85. The disbursements, made under Titles I and II of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 241a (Supp. 11 1984), were used to subsi-
dize instruction in basic studies, such as reading and arithmetic, and to purchase text-
books. Id. at 85-86.
22. Id. at 86. The establishment clause prohibits Congress from passing any "law
respecting an establishment of religion ... U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
23. 392 U.S. at 101.
24. Id. at 102.
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articulated two conditions that must be met as a requisite for standing.
First, plaintiffs must establish a connection between their status as tax-
payers and the legislation attacked.2 5 Taxpayers would thus have stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality only of "exercises of congressional
power under the taxing and spending clause of art. I sec. 8," and would
consequently lack standing to challenge expenditures incidental to an
essentially regulatory scheme. 26 Second, taxpayer-plaintiffs must estab-
lish a further nexus between their status and the substantive issues they
seek to litigate. This prong requires that a taxpayer show that the chal-
lenged enactment exceeds "specific constitutional limitations" on the
congressional taxing and spending power, and not that it was simply
"beyond the powers delegated to Congress."' 27 When both prongs are
established, the litigant will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the out-
come of the controversy and will be a proper and appropriate party to
invoke a federal court's jurisdiction.
28
The major change in the direction of standing came in the 1974
companion decisions of United States v. Richardson 2 9 and Schlesinger v. Re-
servist to Stop the War.3 0 These cases emphasized separation of powers
principles in holding that a direct injury, not merely a general public
interest, is required for standing. Neither as a citizen nor as a taxpayer
may one invoke judicial review simply to vindicate a belief in the need
for lawful conduct by Congress or public officials.
3 1
In Richardson, the plaintiff alleged that the Central Intelligence
Act, 32 which provided for the nondisclosure of the CIA's expenditures,
violated the accounts clause of the Constitution.3 3 The Court held that
the plaintiff lacked standing under the Flast double-nexus test on two
grounds: first, because he challenged a statute regulating executive
agency action, not an exercise of Congress' taxing and spending power;
second, because he made no allegation that funds were spent "in viola-
tion of a 'specific constitutional limitation.' ",34 The Court therefore
concluded that there was no "logical nexus" between the plaintiff's sta-
tus "of taxpayer and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 102-03. The Court distinguished Frothingham on this basis. Id. at 104-05.
Mrs. Frothingham alleged that Congress' action, by infringing the state's tenth amend-
ment rights, caused an increase in her tax bill. Id. at 105. She failed, however, to allege
any right that specifically protected her from the increased tax liability, and she therefore
lacked standing under the second nexus of the Flast test. Id.
28. Id. at 102-03. The Court stated that the plaintiffs satisfied the first nexus because
they challenged an exercise of Congress' taxing and spending power, and satisfied the
second nexus because the Court found the first amendment to be a "specific constitutional
limitation" on congressional taxing and spending power. Id. at 103.
29. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
30. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
31. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 67.
32. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
33. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, (the accounts clause requires that a "regular State-
ment and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time")
34. 418 U.S. at 175.
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Executive to supply a more detailed report of the [CIA's]
expenditures."
'3 5
The plaintiffs in Schlesinger sought to enjoin the membership of con-
gressmen in the military reserves, alleging that such membership vio-
lated the incompatibility clause.3 6 On the issue of citizen standing,
37
the Court found only "injury in the abstract."3 8 The Court found that
taxpayer standing did not exist because the plaintiffs below "did not
challenge an enactment under art. I, sec. 8, but rather the action of the
Executive Branch in permitting Members of Congress to maintain their
Reserve status."
39
Since Richardson and Schlesinger the Court has continued to restrict
taxpayer standing, even in establishment clause cases. In Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,40 the
plaintiff organization alleged that the grant of federal property to a reli-
gious college violated the establishment clause.4 1 In holding that plain-
tiffs failed to satisfy the first nexus of the Flast test42 and therefore lacked
standing, the Court delineated a more precise definition. First, the ac-
tion challenged the decision of an executive agency to transfer property,
not an exercise of congressional power.4 3 Second, the legislation that
authorized the transfer was passed under the property clause of article
IV, not the taxing and spending clause of article I.
44
b. Political Question
The doctrine of standing is often confused with other aspects of
justiciability which focus on the issues in a suit and their amenability to
35. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (the incompatibility clause states that "no Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office")
37. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. 208. The Court held that plaintiffs had no standing as citizens
because they had not suffered a judicially cognizable injury. 418 U.S. at 216-17.
38. Id. at 217. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected claims of standing predi-
cated on a citizen's right to require that the government behave in accordance with the
Constitution. See generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 482-83
(1982).
39. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228.
40. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
41. Id. at 469. According to the Court, the plaintiffs lacked standing as citizens be-
cause they failed to allege a judicially cognizable injury, although the Court implied that
this result might be different had the plaintiffs resided near the transferred federal prop-
erty. Id. at 487 n.23.
42. 454 U.S. at 479-80.
43. Id. at 479. "The plaintiffs in Flast satisfied this test because '[t]heir constitutional
challenge [was] made to an exercise by Congress of its power under art. I, sec. 8, to spend
for the general welfare,'. . . and because the Establishment Clause, on which plaintiffs'
complaint rested, 'operated as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by
Congress of the taxing and spending power conferred by art. I, sec. 8. Id. (quoting
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968)).
44. Id. at 480. The authorizing legislation, the Federal Property and Administrative
Service Act of 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 377 (1949) was an evident exercise of Congress'
power under the property clause, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Id.
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
judicial resolution. 4 5 However, because other justiciability inquiries are
concerned with the nature of the issues, they necessarily involve a more
extensive inquiry into the merits of the case.
4 6
Most discussions of the political question doctrine speak in terms of
justiciability. 4 7 This concept reflects judicial concern that goes beyond
the limits of article III of the Constitution: a concern for the "proper -
and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic society." '4 8
This concern manifests itself in the judicially created prudential limita-
tions on the exercise of federal court jurisdiction which, while "closely
related ' 49 to the case or controversy requirement of article III of the
45. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1968) (standing does not involve a
determination of whether substantive issues in a case are suitable for judicial resolution,
i.e., justiciable). Those justiciability inquiries that focus on the substantive issues include
the political question doctrine, mootness, ripeness, and the prohibition against advisory
opinion. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 12, §§ 3-10 to 3-17.
In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court provided a comprehensive list of
factors that indicate when an issue is a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 217. These
factors range from those that constitutionally commit the issue to a separate branch, to
those that compel a court to avoid the issue because of policy concerns. Id. For a thor-
ough treatment of the possible constitutional, prudential, and functional sources of the
factors in Baker, see L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 3-16, note 1.
The doctrines of standing and political question are often confused and used inter-
changeably, in part because of the Supreme Court's own imprecise characterization of the
two. For example, in Flast, the Court defined standing as an "aspect ofjusticiability" and
then cited Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Mis-use of "Standing", 14 STAN. L. REV. 433, 453
(1962), for the proposition that many of the problems with standing arise because it is
used as a shorthand for the "elements of justiciability," without defining precisely what
element ofjusticiability was represented by standing. 392 U.S. at 98-99. Moreover, the
Flast Court developed a standing test that required an examination of the substantive is-
sues, id. at 102, despite its declaration that standing questions are decided without refer-
ence to the justiciability of the substantive issues involved, id. at 100. See also L. TRIBE,
supra note 12, § 3-20 at 90 (in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974), the Court unnecessarily used standing to dismiss the suit, although a variety of
pre-existing justiciability inquiries were already designed to handle the question
adequately).
46. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 206-07 (1974) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). Justice Stewart argued that the case, though appealed on standing grounds, in
reality was dismissed on the issue of justiciability and that the case should therefore be
remanded, because a proper justiciability inquiry requires a more extensive analysis of the
merits than standing requires. Id.
Courts often dismiss cases on standing grounds to avoid more difficult and involved
justiciability inquiries. See Schlesinger v. Reservist Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
215 (1974) (the Court commented that "[t]he more sensitive and complex task of deter-
mining whether a particular issue presents a political question causes courts .. .to turn
initially ... to the question of standing to sue") For the proposition that Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), was decided on standing grounds to avoid an inquiry into the
justiciability of the issues involved, see Finklestein,Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV.,
338, 359-64 (1923).
47. For discussion on the nature of a political question see Field, The Doctrine of Polit-
ical Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1924); Finkelstein, Further Notes on
Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 HARV. L. REV. 221 (1925); Henkin, Is There a "Political Question"
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976);Jackson, The Political Question Doctrine: Where Does it Stand
After Powell v. McCormack, O'Brien v. Brown and Gilligan v. Morgan?, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 477
(1973); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J.
517 (1966); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REV. 296 (1925); See also Bickel, The
Supreme Court 1960 Term-Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Wechs-
ler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
48. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
49. Id. at 500.
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Constitution, are "essentially matters of judicial self-governance. '"50
The "political question" doctrine postulates that there exist certain is-
sues of constitutional law that are more effectively resolved by the polit-
ical branches of government and are therefore inappropriate for judicial
resolution.
5'
The political question doctrine has existed in some form since the
earliest days of the republic. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Mar-
shall recognized that "[q]uestions in their nature political, or which are,
by the [C]onstitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court."'5 2 In 1962, the Supreme Court gave its fullest treat-
ment of the doctrine to date. In Baker v. Carr,5 3 voters in Tennessee
alleged that the apportionment of the state legislature produced ine-
quality of representation in violation of the equal protection clause. In a
detailed opinion, the Court held that the political question doctrine did
not bar the federal courts from considering an equal protection chal-
lenge to a state voting apportionment structure. 54 The Supreme Court
identified a list of general criteria to determine whether cases can prop-
erly be deemed political questions:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly
according to the settings in which the questions arise may de-
scribe a political question, although each has one or more ele-
ments which identify it as essentially a function of the
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
50. Id. See also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring). As professor Tribe aptly stated:
There is, thus, a political question doctrine. It does not mark certain provisions
of the Constitution as off-limits to judicial interpretation. But it does require fed-
eral courts to determine whether constitutional provisions which litigants would
have judges enforce do in fact lend themselves to interpretation as guarantees of
enforceable rights. To make such a determination, a court must first of all con-
strue the relevant constitutional text, and seek to identify the purposes the partic-
ular provision serves within the constitutional scheme as a whole. At this stage of
the analysis, the court would find particularly relevant the fact that the constitu-
tional provision by its terms grants authority to another branch of government, if
the provision recognizes such authority, the court will have to consider the possi-
bility of conflicting conclusions, and the actual necessity for parallel judicial and
political remedies. But ultimately, the political question inquiry turns as much on
the court's conception ofjudicial competence as on the constitutional text. Thus
the political question doctrine, like other justiciability doctrines, at bottom re-
flects the mixture of constitutional interpretation and judicial discretion which is
an inevitable byproduct of the efforts of federal courts to define their own
limitations.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 79 (1978).
51. The Supreme Court has held that the political question doctrine is inapplicable to
constitutional challenges to actions of state governments. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
226 (1962). However, one leading commentator has argued that the doctrine has not his-
torically been limited in this manner. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 538-39 (1966).
52. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). See also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849) (the lawlessness of a state government is a political question committed to
Congress).
53. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
54. Id. at 209.
19881
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political de-
cision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the
case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on
the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of
which we treat is one of "political questions," not one of "polit-
ical cases." The courts cannot reject as "no law suit" a bona
fide controversy as to whether some action denominated
"political" exceeds constitutional authority. The cases we have
reviewed show the necessity for discriminating inquiry into the
precise facts and posture of the particular case, and the impos-
sibility of resolution by any semantic cataloging.
5 5
Several categories of cases have helped mold the political question
doctrine. One category contains cases arising under the guarantee
clause of article IV of the Constitution.5 6 In Luther v. Borden,57 the
Supreme Court refused to determine which of two competing bodies
was the legitimate government of Rhode Island. Referring to article IV,
the Court concluded that it is Congress'job to decide which government
was the proper one, and whether that government was republican.
Once this decision was made it could not be questioned by the
judiciary.
5 8
Another category of political question cases concerns the foreign
relations of the United States. One commentator argues that the consti-
tutionally granted power to administer foreign affairs is divided between
the executive and legislative departments, completely excluding the ju-
diciary. 59 In Baker, the Court agreed that foreign relations cases often
required standards for resolution beyond judicial competence, and that
there was often a need for a "single-voiced statement of the govern-
ment's views." '60 The Court concluded, however, that before acting in
55. Id. at 217.
56. U.S. CONST., Art. IV., section 4 states in part, "The United States shall guarantee
to every state in this Union a Republican Form of Government .. " The Supreme Court
has generally held that only Congress and the President, and not the judiciary, can enforce
the guarantee clause on the ground that all issues under the guarantee clause raise nonjus-
ticiable "political questions." See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Highland Farms
Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Ohio v. Akron Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930); Davis
v. Ohio, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Pacific Telephone v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Taylor
and Marshall v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
57. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
58. Id. at 42, 47.
59. See Weston, supra note 47, at 318-29. See generally, Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of
Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1962).
60. 369 U.S. at 21.1-12. In a footnote, Justice Brennan cited an example of such
"sweeping statements: " The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
[Vol. 65:4
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some cases it needed to assess the handling of a question by the political
branches and the possible consequences of judicial action.6 1
The Court's role in deciding whether an issue is committed to an-
other branch, in the context of whether Congress can control its own
membership, is well illustrated by Powell v. McCormack.6 2 The area of
impeachment is often considered a political question. Article I, section
2 of the Constitution gives the House sole power of impeachment, and
section 3 gives the Senate sole power to try impeachments. No statute
defines impeachable offenses; thus it would be difficult for the Court to
apply any judicial criteria for review of a legislative decision to im-
peach. 63 Nonetheless, when presented with the issue, the Court did not
dismiss the question of the exclusion of a member of Congress from the
House of Representatives.
64
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell was re-elected to Congress in
November 1966, but the Congress voted to exclude him. Powell sought
a declaratory judgment that his exclusion was unconstitutional. The re-
spondents argued that, pursuant to article I, section 5,65 upon a two-
thirds vote of the House a member could be expelled for any reason.
Without deciding the question of the justiciability of the right of the
House to expel a member, the Court determined that exclusion was a
justiciable issue. The Court stated that section 5 did not give the House
judicially unreviewable power to set and judge qualifications for mem-
bership, 6 6 and concluded "that the Constitution leaves the House with-
out authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who
meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the
Constitution."
6 7
An important consequence of the political question doctrine is that
holding it applicable to a cause of action theory renders the govern-
ment's conduct immune from judicial review. 68 Unlike other restric-
tions on judicial review - such as case or controversy requirements,
standing, and ripeness, all of which may be cured by different factual
circumstances - a holding of nonjusticiability is absolute in its foreclo-
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-"the political"--Depart-
ments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.' " Id. at 211 n.31 (quoting
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
61. 369 U.S. at 211-12.
62. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
63. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109-10
(1978).
64. Powell, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Adam Clayton Powell was re-elected to Congress
while under heavy suspicion of wrongdoing. The House of Representatives refused to
seat him on the grounds of improprieties committed as a congressman.
65. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2, states, "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member."
66. 395 U.S. at 520-22.
67. Id. at 522. (Emphasis in original.) The Court in Powell concluded that Congress'
discretion in seating members is limited to expulsion for failure to meet the age, citizen-
ship, or residence requirements of art. I, sec. 2. Id. at 548.
68. Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 209.
1988]
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sure of judicial scrutiny. 69
B. Specific Doctrines Limiting Judicial Review: Phelps v. Reagan
1. Case in Context
In Phelps v. Reagan,70 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas' dismissal of
an action requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Fred W. Phelps,
an attorney and Baptist minister, filed an action challenging President
Ronald Reagan's appointment of William A. Wilson as United States
Ambassador to the Vatican, or Holy See. Phelps sought a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief, claiming that the institution of such rela-
tions, and particularly the appointment of an ambassador to the Holy
See, violated the first amendment of the Constitution.
The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss
holding that Phelps lacked standing to maintain the action and that the
case presented a nonjusticiable political question. Phelps appealed but
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held
that a taxpayer and minister did not have standing to challenge the ap-
propriations involved and that the question of whether to appoint an
ambassador was vested solely in the executive branch, and could not be
reviewed by a court.
7 1
2. Statement of the Case
As a citizen, taxpayer, and minister of the Old School Baptist Order,
Phelps filed a complaint in district court. Phelps claimed that the ap-
pointment of an ambassador to the Holy See, and the formalization of
diplomatic relations with the Holy See, violated the first amendment.
He charged that the Holy See is not a foreign government with which
the United States has a legitimate need to establish foreign relations, but
is instead the headquarters of the Roman Catholic Church. Phelps al-
leged that the government's conduct was patently violative of the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment, in that it purposely
accomplished a predominantly religious purpose, had the effect of favor-
ing one religion over another, and involved the entanglement of the
United States in the religious affairs of a church. Phelps claimed stand-
ing to bring suit as a taxpayer and citizen, and as a Baptist minister with
a vested religious interest in the separation of church and state. Phelps
requested a declaration that the government's conduct violated the first
amendment and an injunction restraining the government from estab-
lishing full diplomatic relations with the Holy See or sending an ambas-
sador to the Holy See.
The government sought dismissal of the suit. They argued that the
court was without subject matter jurisdiction, since Phelps lacked stand-
69. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 102 (1986).
70. 812 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1987).
71. Id. at 1294.
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ing and presented nonjusticiable questions.7 2
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of Phelps'
claim that he had standing to sue as a taxpayer under the doctrine set
forth in Flast.73 He alleged that tax funds were being used to fund the
diplomatic mission to the Holy See and the expenses of the United
States Ambassador to the Holy See. Phelps clearly did not meet the
two-part test to establish taxpayer standing set forth in Flast.
To invoke the power of a federal court, a party must show that "he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct in-
jury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in
some indefinite way in common with people generally."'7 4 In light of the
Supreme Court's decisions in the area of taxpayer standing, and the de-
cision in Valley Forge in particular, two points are well established. First,
the extremely narrow taxpayer standing doctrine of Flast v. Cohen may
not be invoked to challenge an action arising exclusively in the executive
branch. Second, to the extent that congressional action may be chal-
lenged under Flast, the challenge must be directed at a federal spending
program enacted pursuant to the taxing and spending power of art. I,
sec. 8, cl. 1.
Phelps, like the plaintiffs in Valley Forge75 and Schlesinger76 failed to
satisfy the Flast test. As in those cases, Phelps' real challenge was to the
actions of executive branch officials, and not to a congressional spend-
ing program enacted under the taxing and spending power of art. I, sec.
8, cl. 1. The appropriation of money by Congress for support of our
embassies cannot be considered an exercise of Congress' taxing and
spending power for the general welfare. Rather, it is spending pursuant
to Congress' power in the area of foreign relations.
7 7
While Phelps rested his assertion of standing primarily on his status
as a taxpayer, he also seemed to claim standing as a non-tax-
payer/citizen. He appeared to claim that he had standing to enforce the
values which underlie the establishment clause of the first amendment.
The Tenth Circuit also discounted this argument by affirming the dis-
trict court's holding that he failed to establish non-taxpayer standing.
Phelps' alleged injuries were simply a recasting of the policies which un-
derlie the establishment clause - i.e., not preferring one religion over
another and prohibiting entanglement in church affairs. Therefore,
Phelps was simply attempting to claim standing to enforce establishment
clause values. But as the Supreme Court's decision in Valley Forge
78
squarely holds, it is not enough to simply allege a belief that governmen-
72. Id.
73. Flast, 392 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1968).
74. Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
75. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479-80.
76. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228 n.17.
77. See, TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-17 (1978).
78. 454 U.S. at 482-486. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
tal action violates the Constitution, or a desire to protect the policies
which underlie the establishment clause. Phelps alleged that the formal-
ization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Holy
See placed the nation's official imprimatur of recognition and approval
upon a selected religion, in aid of that religion, and in preference of that
religion over all other religions, thereby entangling this government in
the affairs of that religion in violation of the establishment clause of the
first amendment.
79
What Phelps described are theories supporting his claim of a consti-
tutional violation, and not "distinct and palpable" injuries that he had
personally sustained or was in immediate danger of sustaining. Like
Phelps, the plaintiffs in Valley Forge claimed standing on the basis that
they had a spiritual stake in the case to enforce etablishment clause val-
ues.80 The reasoning of Valley Forge is controlling here because standing
is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of
his advocacy; nor are his strong beliefs or commitment to a constitu-
tional principle a permissible substitute for the showing of injury it-
self.8 1 Even assuming that some plaintiff had met the requisite standing,
questions of diplomatic relations are committed by the Constitution to
final decision by the Executive Branch and thus present nonjusticiable
political questions.
8 2
The Tenth Circuit also rejected Phelps' argument that the court
could review the President's decision to enter into formal diplomatic re-
lations with the Holy See. It has long been settled that the President's
resolution of such questions constitutes a judicially unreviewable polit-
ical decision.83 Application of the political question doctrine calls upon
the court to determine whether the Constitution itself prohibits judicial
intrusion because the matter in dispute has been committed to a coequal
branch of government, and whether prudential considerations make a
judicial resolution inappropriate.8 4 In this case, the factors discussed in
Baker clearly indicate that the matter presented a nonjusticiable political
question.8 5 Judicial reluctance to become involved in the running of
foreign affairs, and to second-guess the judgments of the political
branches which make foreign policy decisions, is further compelled by
the standards discussed in Baker.8 6 These factors have special applica-
tion to this case since there is a constitutional commitment to recognize
governments and appoint and receive ambassadors in art. II, sec. 2, cl.
2, sec. 3. Resolution of Phelps' claims would be impossible without an
initial policy determination, which would clearly amount to nonjudicial
79. Phelps, 812 F.2d at 1294.
80. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 482-83.
81. Id. at 486.
82. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Reagan, 786 F.2d 194,
201-02 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). Baker v. Carr is the case
most frequently cited in discussions of the nonjusticiability of certain issues.
83. Id. at 201.
84. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211.
85. Id. at 217.
86. Id. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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discretion.8 7 Moreover, to undertake the review requested by Phelps
would be impossible as expressing lack of respect due coordinate
branches of government. 88 To adjudicate this claim would have re-
quired the court to second-guess the decision of the President to ap-
point an ambassador and establish formal relations with the Holy See.
Plainly, adjudication of Phelps' claim would have permitted the court to
enter an order severing our relations with the Holy See and directing
the removal of Ambassador Wilson, involving the "potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question."8 9 In short, it is difficult to think of a case where the
concerns discussed in Baker v. Carr are more applicable.
4. Implications of Holding
The precedential weight of this holding within the Tenth Circuit
demonstrates that although the Flast exception represents a significant
departure, from the Frothingham rule, there are clear limits to that excep-
tion. The court's follow of the Third Circuit's lead in this area is an
acknowledgment by the Tenth Circuit that there has been no change in
the law of standing to require a departure from the Frothingham, Flast, or
Valley Forge line of cases. Even though the court spent a lot of time ad-
dressing standing, the effect of this holding illustrates that once the is-
sues in a particular case are found to rest on the political question
doctrine, there is no need to address the issue of standing because a
court could not adjudicate such a case absent the requisite subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. Although the Tenth Circuit did not directly address the
issues presented in this case, it is likely that other courts will follow suit
in the areas of the standing and political question doctrines.




The first amendment prohibits the government from infringing
upon the people's right to free speech.90 Where first amendment pro-
tections begin and end is unclear; Supreme Court Justices and legal
scholars have heatedly debated the contours of the first amendment for
many years. 9 ' Generally, a court that reviews an ordinance or statute
abridging speech will make an initial analysis in the following manner. If
87. Id. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 n.43 (1969).
88. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
89. Id.
90. The first amendment provides, in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment is extended to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. For cases applying the first amendment to
the states, see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925).
91. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (majority adopted a balanc-
ing approach recognizing that speech may be restricted to favor a "subordinating" govern-
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the law prohibits only a category of speech unprotected by the first
amendment, the law will stand because there has been no constitution-
ally relevant abridgment of free speech.9 2 If the regulation as written is
wholly contradictory to the freedom of speech guarantee, the court will
strike it down as unconstitutional "on its face."
9 3
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,9 4 the Court struck
down a West Virginia statute which compelled all students to participate
in a daily flag salute ceremony, on the grounds that the law violated the
first amendment by forcing students to declare a particular belief. The
crucial question was "whether such a ceremony so touching matters of
opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the individual by
official authority under powers committed to any political organization
under our Constitution." 9 5 Thus, for the Court, the issue was not
whether the children should be allowed an exemption from a required
ceremony, but whether governmental officials had the legitimate author-
ity to compel such participation in the first instance.9 6 The Court up-
held the right of the students, for whom saluting the flag was a serious
violation of religious duty, to be exempt from a school procedure which
forced them to express support for values which directly conflicted with
those espoused by their subcommunity. The Court, rather than evaluat-
ing the wisdom of the governmental policy, focused on the freedom of
speech clause of the first amendment and found that it contained a core
mental interest). Justice Harlan delivered the majority opinion in Konigsberg, specifically
rejecting the "absolutist" approach of Justice Black. Id. at 49-50.
As does Justice Black, Alexander Meiklejohn, a noted advocate of free speech, views
the first amendment as an absolute-a specific reservation of sovereign power by the peo-
ple to themselves. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245,
253-54. Meiklejohn suggested that the first amendment necessarily must protect all com-
munication that insures that the people will acquire and maintain the experience and
knowledge to effectively govern themselves. According to Meiklejohn, protected speech
therefore includes, among other things, education and any speech promoting an under-
standing of philosophy, the sciences, literature, the arts, and public issues. Id. at 256-57.
For other theories regarding first amendment protection, see Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (proposing protection of only polit-
ical speech); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877
(1963) (arguing for "definitional balancing").
For a general discussion of the first amendment, see BeVier, "The First Amendment and
Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of the Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299
(1978) (overview of the scope of the first amendment protections); DuVal, Free Communica-
tion of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudica-
tion, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 161 (1972) (general discussion of approaches to first
amendment protections).
92. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Chaplinsky Court
concluded that the Constitution does not prohibit a state from punishing "fighting words"
or speech which is "lewd or obscene." Id. at 571-72.
93. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The Lovell Court found an ordi-
nance requiring a license to distribute religious pamphlets invalid on its face. The Court
stated that the regulation struck "at the very foundation of the freedom of the press." Id.
at 451. For Justice Stone's now famous statement that legislation which directly en-
croaches upon the domain of one of the first ten amendments must fall within a "narrower
scope" to receive the Court's "presumption of constitutionality," see United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
94. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
95. Id. at 636.
96. Id. at 634-36.
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of absolute protection which the government could not infringe consti-
tutionally, regardless of any perceived wisdom in so doing. Underscor-
ing the pivotal position of free expression within the American
constitutional framework and the necessity for school authorities to
honor first amendment guarantees within their classrooms, Justice Jack-
son wrote for the Court majority: "If there is any fixed star in our con-
stitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."
9 7
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,9 8 the
Supreme Court recognized that neither student nor teacher "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate." 99 The dispute in Tinker arose when three students decided
to publicize their opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing black arm-
bands to school. The principals of the schools became aware of the plan
and adopted a policy that students wearing armbands to school would
be asked to remove them; students refusing would be suspended until
they returned to school without the armbands. The students were aware
of the regulation, but they ignored it and were suspended. 100 The
Court held that the students' suspensions violated the first amendment
because the school administrators failed to show that the students' "si-
lent, passive"'' expression of opinion materially and substantially in-
terfered with school discipline and operation or collided with the rights
of the other students.'
0 2
In reaching its conclusion, the Court balanced the schools' concern
with discipline against the students' right to freedom of expression.
10 3
The Court rejected the district court's conclusion that school adminis-
trators acted reasonably in suspending the students because of the fear
that the students wearing the armbands might cause a disturbance. This
form of expression, "symbolic speech," the Court stated, is protected by
the first amendment and cannot be prohibited merely because of school
officials' fears of disruption. 0 4 The first amendment protects certain
97. Id. at 642.
98. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
99. Id. at 506.
100. Id. at 504. The students sought an injunction restraining the school district from
disciplining them. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp.
971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966). The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the school principals' actions were constitutionally permissible because they prevented the
students from disturbing school discipline. Id. The Eighth Circuit considered the case en
banc and, by an equally divided court, affirmed the district court's decision without opin-
ion. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967)
(en banc).
101. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 541.
102. Id. at 513.
103. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-08; see also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
104. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. The school administrators attempted to justify the regula-
tion on the grounds that some friends of a former classmate who was killed in Vietnam
might confront the students and cause a disturbance. Id. at 509 n.3.
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types of conduct as a symbolic form of speech. 10 5 When the govern-
ment attempts to regulate the conduct aspect of that speech, however, it
necessarily effects an incidental restriction on the speech. The Supreme
Court developed analysis for incidental restrictions on speech in United
States v. O'Brien.10 6 In O'Brien, a draft resister challenged his conviction
under a federal statute that prohibited the destruction of draft cards;
O'Brien contended that the statute infringed upon his freedom of
speech.' 0 7 The Court upheld the federal statute and O'Brien's convic-
tion. In doing so, it established a four-part test for evaluating a regula-
tion that governs conduct, but incidentally restricts speech.1
0 8
Governmental regulation of expressive conduct should be sustained
... if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.10 9
2. Equal Protection
Each of the guarantees of the first amendment has been held to be a
fundamental right and made applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, when a state bur-
dens the freedom of speech, the law must be analyzed under the strict
scrutiny required by the first amendment as well as the general guaran-
tees of the due process and equal protection provisions."10 Whenever a
statute allows some persons to speak, but not others, the statute at issue
may be analyzed under equal protection as well as first amendment prin-
ciples.''' Pursuant to such a statute, a state or local government has the
power to treat different classes of persons in different ways in the area of
public health, safety and morality,' 12 unless the classification is based on
"criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of [the] statute."' 13 Govern-
mental bodies cannot, however, legislate persons into different classifi-
cations when the classifications are unrelated to the objective of the
legislation.1 14 If the classification is reasonable, the remedial scheme
105. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (striking statute prohibiting dis-
play of red flag); see also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(rejecting requirement that children salute flag in violation of their religious beliefs).
106. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
107. Id. at 376. The Court noted that a "sufficiently important government interest in
regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on first amendment
freedoms." Id.
108. Id. at 377.
109. Id. See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975) (discussion of the impli-
cations of the symbolic speech cases); Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-
Card Burning Case, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. I (discussion of the O'Brien case).
110. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 783 (3d ed. 1986).
111. Id. at 852.
112. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
113. Id. at 76. (The ends must of course be legitimate.)
114. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
[Vol. 65:4
CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
does not violate the equal protection clause "simply because it fail[s]...
to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked."
' 15
3. Vagueness and Overbreadth
The Court will strike down a regulation for vagueness if the word-
ing of the law is unclear and leaves speakers uncertain as to whether
their speech will fall within the rule's prohibition. A statute violates due
process if it is so vague that a person of common intelligence cannot
discern what conduct is prohibited, required, or tolerated. 1 16 Review-
ing courts will also strike down a regulation that chills speech if the reg-
ulation is overbroad, that is, if it reaches speech that is protected by the
first amendment as well as unprotected speech.' '7
In recent years the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the
overbreadth doctrine," l8 so that only when a reviewing court deter-
mines that a statute or ordinance is substantially overbroad may the
court strike it down under the overbreadth doctrine. 19
B. Freedom of Expression: Mini Spas v. South Salt Lake City Corp.
1. Case in Context
Mini Spas v. South Salt Lake City Corp. ,120 involved the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeal's review of the District Court for the District of Utah's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of South Salt Lake. This
was an action seeking to have an ordinance of the City of Salt Lake,
Utah 12 1 declared invalid as in conflict with the Constitution of the
115. Id.
116. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
117. The overbreadth rule allows a court to strike down a statute that, while designed
to prohibit activities not protected by the constitution, also prohibits activities which are
constitutionally protected. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 868 (2d ed. 1983).
118. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). The Broadrick court rejected an
overbreadth challenge to Oklahoma's limitation on permissible political activity by civil
servants. The majority concluded that: "particularly where conduct and not merely
speech is involved ... the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as
well .... Id. at 615; See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The Ferber court
concluded that New York's statute prohibiting the sale of any material depicting a child
engaged in sexual activity was not unconstitutionally overbroad. The court determined
that "the extent of deterrence of protected speech can be expected to decrease with the
declining reach of the regulation." Id. at 772. The Ferber court extended the substantiality
requirement from cases involving conduct combined with speech to traditional forms of
speech-books and films. Id. at 771.
119. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
120. 810 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1987).
121. The Ordinance, in pertinent parts, reads:
(4) Each establishment shall provide to all patrons clean, sanitary and opaque
coverings capable of covering the patron's specified anatomical areas. No
common use of such covering shall be permitted, and reuse is prohibited
unless having been adequately cleaned. In addition, no owner, operator,
responsible managing employee, manager, or licensee in charge of or in
control of the massage establishment shall permit nor shall any employee of
masseur administer a massage unless the patron is covered by the covering
provided by the establishment.
(5) With the exception of bathrooms, dressing rooms, or any room utilized for
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United States. The provisions of the ordinance mandated a dress code
for massage parlor employees. Mini Spas, Inc. and the Society of Li-
censed Masseurs ("Mini Spas"), massage establishments doing business
in South Salt Lake, contended that the dress code was unconstitutional
because it proscribed expressive conduct in the form of nudity.12 2 The
city countered that the ordinance was enacted to control prostitution.12
3
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed by both parties. The
district court granted the city's motion, upholding the ordinance.
In its affirmance of the district court's grant of summary judgment,
the Tenth Circuit held that: the city had a legitimate interest in regulat-
ing prostitution; the purpose of the ordinance was unrelated to inhib-
iting freedom of expression; the ordinance was not overly restrictive,
overbroad, or unconstitutionally vague; and it did not violate equal
protection.
The importance of this holding is that where a city adopts an ordi-
nance regulating conduct which it seeks to restrict, the ordinance must
be only restrictive enough to further the city's interest, that interest
must be a substantial one, and the city must draft the ordinance so that it
is a valid exercise of the police power. Regulation of prostitution falls
within this category.
2. Statement of the Case
On October 13, 1982, South Salt Lake adopted an ordinance enti-
dressing purposes, no owner, operator, responsible managing employee,
manager, or licensee in charge of or in control of any massage establishment
shall permit any person in any area within the massage establishment which
is used in common by the patrons or which can be viewed by patrons from
such an area, unless the person's specified anatomical areas are fully cov-
ered. In addition, no owner, operator, responsible managing employee,
manager or licensee in charge of or in control of a massage establishment
shall permit any person to be in any room with another person unless all
persons' specified anatomical areas are fully covered.
(6) No owner, operator, responsible managing employee, manager, or licensee
in charge of or in control of a massage establishment shall permit any mas-
seur or employee to be on the premises of a massage establishment during
its hours of operation while performing or available to perform any task or
service associated with the operation of a massage business, unless the mas-
seur or employee is fully covered from a point not to exceed four (4) inches
above the center of the knee cap to the back of the neck. The covering will
be of an opaque material and will be maintained in a clean and sanitary
condition.
(7) No masseur or employee, while performing any task or service associated
with the massage business, shall be present in any room with another person
unless the person's specified anatomical areas are fully covered.
(8) No masseur or employee shall be on the premise of a massage establishment
during its hours of operation while performing or available to perform any
task or service associated with the operation of a massage business, unless
the masseur or employee is fully covered from a point not to exceed four (4)
inches above the center of the knee cap to the base of the neck. For pur-
poses of this subsection, the covering will be of an opaque material and will
be maintained in a clean and sanitary condition.
SOUTH SALT LAKE, UTAH, REV. ORDINANCES tit. 38, ch. 8, § 3B-8-5 (1974) (as amended).




tied "Massage Parlors and Masseurs." 12 4 The purpose of the ordinance
was to regulate the licensing, dress, and operation requirements of mas-
sage parlors. Mini Spas attacked the constitutionality of the ordinance,
contending that the dress code (1) was unreasonable, arbitrary, over-
broad, and violated Mini Spa's first amendment right of freedom of ex-
pression; (2) denied equal protection of the law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment; and (3) was unconstitutionally vague in viola-
tion of due process.
125
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit recognized that non-verbal, expressive conduct
has often been accorded first amendment protection,' 2 6 but that not all
conduct is necessarily "speech" under that amendment. 12 7 In O'Brien,
the Court stated "[w]e can not accept the view that an apparently limit-
less variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person en-
gaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."1 28 Nudity per
se is not accorded protection under the first amendment. 129 What is
protected as "speech" is expressive conduct. An example of protected
conduct would be nude dancing.130 The dress code ordinance of South
Salt Lake does not regulate nude dancing nor modeling, rather the dress
code regulates the manner in which massage practitioners should be
dressed while practicing their profession.
The Supreme Court also noted that "when 'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements arecombined in the same course of conduct, a suffi-
ciently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech el-
ement can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms."' 13 1 Using the above cited cases, it is clear that the dress code
passed the O'Brien test, therefore, constitutional muster as well. Accord-
ing to the mayor of Salt Lake, the ordinance was enacted to both ensure
that the massage parlors within the city be run in a clean, professional
manner and that the massage parlors not be allowed to degenerate into
houses of prostitution. 13 2 These non-speech elements of the ordinance
justify whatever small limitation there might be on any speech because
the government of Salt Lake has a substantial interest in the health and
moral welfare of the citizenry which it has addressed through its mas-
sage parlor ordinance.
The Tenth Circuit, in reaching its conclusion, adopted the initial
requirements for an overbreadth challenge outlined in Broadrick v.
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
125. Mini Spas, 810 F.2d at 940
126. Id. at 941 (citing as examples West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969)).
127. Mini Spas, 810 F.2d at 941 (citing U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
128. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
129. Aini Spas, 810 F.2d at 941.
130. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc, 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975).
131. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
132. Mini Spas, 810 F.2d at 941-42.
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Oklahoma.' 33 The court recognized that the overbreadth doctrine re-
flects a concern that a broadly written "statute's very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally pro-
tected speech or expression."' 13 4 "[T]here must be a realistic danger
that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it [the stat-
ute] to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds."' 135 Even if the
manner in which massage practitioners should be dressed while practic-
ing their profession somehow is accorded first amendment protection as
a form of expression, the regulation did not affect the constitutional
rights of any third parties not before the court. Therefore, the over-
breadth challenge failed.
The court recognized that the fourteenth amendment, through its
equal protection clause, does not deny to states the power to treat differ-
ent persons in different ways. 136 However, the equal protection clause
does deny to states the power to legislate that different treatment be
accorded to persons placed by statute into different classes on the basis
of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.' 3 7 The dress
code ordinance's distinction of singling out massage parlors is equally
applicable to every massage practitioner within the South Salt Lake city
limits. South Salt Lake also has a legitimate interest in prohibiting pros-
titution and there is sufficient connection between the dress code provi-
sion and the prohibition of prostitution for the ordinance to be
rationally related to this interest and withstand constitutional attack.
The Tenth Circuit accepted the district court's assumption that the
city would enforce the dress code ordinance in a reasonable manner.
138
By doing so, the court did not have to address the issue of the statute
being subject to more than one interpretation. A statute violates due
process if it is so vague that a person of common intelligence cannot
discern what conduct is prohibited, required, or tolerated.' 39 By ac-
cepting the city's assertion that the restrictions in the ordinance did not
apply to arms and hands of masseurs, the district court was able to con-
strue the ordinance in a way to avoid the problem of unconstitutional
vagueness.14
0
4. Implications of Holding
This decision sends a signal to cities within the Tenth Circuit not to
be too concerned about the vagueness of their ordinances restricting
speech. The Tenth Circuit seems to be saying that if a city can somehow
133. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). See supra notes 118 and 119 and accompanying text.
134. Member of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984)
(quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612). Also, the O'Brien test is applied to states and munici-
pal regulations. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804-05.
135. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801.
136. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75.
137. McDonald, 394 U.S. at 809.
138. Mini Spas, 810 F.2d at 942, 943.
139. Id. at 943. See Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
140. Mini Spas, 810 F.2d at 943.
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show that the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of their police
power, or otherwise meets the O'Brien test, that in the face of vagueness,
it would find a way to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation. It is un-
clear whether other circuits will follow this holding, for ordinances like
statutes, should be drafted to avoid being susceptible to two different
readings.
III. STANDARD APPLIED IN THE TERMINATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
A. Background
1. Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process is derived from the fifth 14 1 and four-
teenth 142 amendments, which only provide protection to individuals
faced with governmental actions that may deprive them of life, liberty or
property. 143 The threshold question facing courts in procedural due
process cases is whether the private interest affected by government ac-
tion can be considered a liberty or property interest. A litigant must
show that he has been deprived of a protected liberty or property inter-
est before he can claim the protection of procedural due process.
144
a. Liberty
Federal courts have recognized a protected liberty interest in one's
reputation 14 5 and freedom to take advantage of alternative means of
employment. 14 6 The Supreme Court furnished a broad definition of lib-
erty that was afforded procedural protection against arbitrary depriva-
tion in Meyer v. Nebraska.14 7 In Miller v. City of Mission, 148 the Tenth
Circuit explained the circumstances in which a public employee's liberty
141. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides in part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law .... "
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states, in part: "[nlor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law .... "
143. See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property" Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL-L. REV. 445, 452 (1977).
144. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (no property interest in non-ten-
ured teaching position). But see Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (implied property
interest in non-tenured teaching system).
145. Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (197 1) (reputation
interest affected by posting notice forbidding sale of liquor to claimant). But see Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (no reputation interest affected by distribution of photo identi-
fying claimant as shoplifter).
146. Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983) (assis-
tant police chief stigmatized by public dissemination of reasons for firing).
147. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In attempting to describe the liberty interest, the Court
stated that liberty "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. at 399.
(emphasis added).
148. 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983).
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interest may be violated by the manner of termination. 149 Miller re-
quired that notice of charges must be given to an employee a reasonable
time before a hearing in order to provide the individual a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.' 50 Miller further required that, except in ex-
tremely unusual situations, the individual must be given a pretermina-
tion hearing in order to be afforded a meaningful time within which to
be heard. 151
In Paul v. Davis,'15 2 however, a sharply divided Court held that state
defamation of a private individual "standing alone and apart from any
other governmental action" did not implicate any liberty protected by
the due process clause. 15 3 The five-person majority argued that "repu-
tation alone, apart from some more tangible interest such as employ-
ment," lay outside the range of liberties protected by the fourteenth
amendment.154 The Court stated that interests other than judicially de-
clared fundamental rights acquire the status of liberty or property pro-
tected by due process only if they "have been initially recognized and
protected by state law."' 5
5
149. See Sullivan v. Stark, 808 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1987).
150. Miller, 705 F.2d at 372.
151. Id. The court stated: " 'The concept of liberty recognizes two particular interests
of a public employee: (1) the protection of his good name, reputation, honor and integ-
rity, and (2) his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. The man-
ner in which a public employee is terminated may deprive him of either or both of these
liberty interests. When the termination is accompanied by public dissemination of the
reasons for dismissal, and those reasons would stigmatize the employee's reputation or
foreclose future employment opportunities, due process requires that the employee be
provided a hearing at which he may test the validity of the profferred grounds for dismis-
sal." Id. at 373 (quoting Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1972)).
152. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The activity challenged in Paul was the distribution by police
of a flyer containing photographs of persons identified as active shoplifters to local
merchants. A picture of Davis was included because he had been arrested on a shoplifting
charge though he was never convicted. Davis brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the chief of police claiming that he had been deprived of liberty without due pro-
cess because the police had damaged his reputation without providing him with a prior
hearing to determine whether he was an active shoplifter.
153. Id. at 694.
154. Id. at 701. Although earlier cases had indicated that the personal interest in repu-
tation was included within the constitutional protection of liberty, the Court fabricated
tenuous ways to distinguish these cases. For example, Justice Rehnquist interpreted (or
rather reinterpreted) the recognition in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971),
of a liberty interest in not having one's name posted by the sheriff in a liquor store as an
alcoholic, as having been based on the fact that the " '[p]osting' . . . significantly altered
[Constantineau's] status as a matter of state law, and it was that alteration of legal status
which, combined with the injury resulting from the defamation, justified the invocation of
procedural safeguards." Id. at 708-09.
On Rehnquist's performance in Paul, one commentator noted: "The Court's re-ra-
tionalization of the earlier cases is wholly startling to anyone familiar with those prece-
dents. In many ways ... this [is] Paul's most disturbing aspect. Fair treatment by the court
of its own precedents is an indispensable condition of judicial legitimacy." Monaghan,
supra note 14, at 424. For additional criticism of the Court's opinion in Paul, see Tushnet,
The Constitutional Right to One's Good Name. An Examination of the Scholarship of Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, 64 6 Ky. L.J. 753, 754-57 (1976).
155. 424 U.S. at 710. The opinion further seemed to suggest that only in these areas of




The definition of property since the 1972 decision in Board of Regents
v. Roth 156 has centered on the concept of "entitlement." In Roth, the
plaintiff was a Wisconsin State University teacher whose one-year con-
tract had not been renewed. He challenged the nonrenewal partly on
the ground that the University's failure to provide a statement of rea-
sons and a hearing violated his right to procedural due process.157 Roth
was untenured, and the relevant Wisconsin statute provided that all
state university teachers would be on probation until they had served
continuously for four years. Because Roth was hired for one year only,
without any promise that his employment would continue beyond that
period, his expectation of reemployment was not "property" and was
therefore not within the protection of the due process clause. Accord-
ingly, Roth was not entitled to any procedural protections over and
above those provided by state law. Roth's substantive interest was "cre-
ated and defined by the terms of his appointment,"' 5 8 and the Court
looked to those state-law terms to determine whether or not Roth's ex-
pectation was "property."'
59
In Pery v. Sindermann,160 a companion case to Roth, the Court exem-
plified the implied contractual approach. In Sindermann, the Court held
that a property interest may arise from "such rules or mutually explicit
understandings that support [an individual's] claim of entitlement to the
benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing."' 6 1 Like Roth, Sindermann
was a teacher at a state college; unlike Roth, he alleged that his institu-
tion had a defacto tenure system. 162 Furthermore, he alleged that he had
legitimately relied on statements in the college's official faculty guide
that purportedly instituted an informal tenure system. ' 63 The Court ac-
cepted Sindermann's argument, advancing two theories to support its
finding that the defacto tenure system created a protected interest - an
implied contract theory and an industrial common law theory.' 64 If
156. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
157. Roth also alleged that his termination was invalid because it transgressed a sub-
stantive limitation. He charged that he had been fired because of first amendment activity.
This charge, however, was not before the Supreme Court; the district court had stayed
proceedings on that issue pending Supreme Court review of the summary judgment. Id. at
574.
158. Id. at 578.
159. Id. at 577. In a frequently cited passage, the Court explained: "To have a prop-
erty interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire
for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it .... Property interests, of course, are not created by
the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. " Id.
See also Vanelli v. Reynolds School Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1982); Kendall v.
Board of Educ., 627 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980).
160. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
161. Id. at 601.
162. Id. at 599-600. Like Roth, Sindermann also claimed he had been terminated for
exercising his free speech right to criticize the school administration. Id. at 594-95.
163. Id. at 600.
164. Id. at 601-02. The court announced that property interests "are not limited by a
few rigid, technical forms," id. at 601, noting that the absence of a written contract does
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Sindermann, on remand, could prove "the legitimacy of his claim of
such entitlement in light of 'the policies and practices of the institu-
tion,' " the Court held, he would be entitled not to reinstatement but to
procedural due process - that is, to a hearing on the grounds for his
termination. 165
An enlightening example of the statutory entitlement approach is
Bishop v. Wood. 16 6 There, the Court closely examined the language of
the relevant state statutes and ordinances to determine whether Bishop,
a probationary employee of the police department, had an enforceable
expectation of continued employment and therefore could be dis-
charged only for cause. 1 6 7 Finding that, under those statutes and ordi-
nances, Bishop's employment was terminable at will, 168 the Court held
that Bishop had no property interest. Consequently, he had no right to
procedural protection against arbitrary dismissal.
169
not foreclose a claim of entitlement supported by principles of implied contract. Id. at
601-02 (citing 3A CORBIN, ON CONTRACTS, §§ 561-72A (1960)). As for the industrial com-
mon law theory, the court stated that Sindermann "might be able to show from the cir-
cumstances of [his] service-and from other relevant facts-that he has a legitimate claim
of entitlement to job tenure." Id. at 602. The basic principle was that a school may create
an entitlement by creating a system of tenure "in practice," much as the common law of a
particular industry may supplement a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 602 (citing
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579-80 (1960) (gaps
in a labor agreement were "to be filled in by reference to the practices of the particular
industry and of the various shops covered by the agreement "-such practices described as
the "common law of the shop")).
It now appears unlikely that a practice alone, with no explicit promise attached, would
be found to create a property entitlement. Subsequent case law has stressed the need for a
"rule or mutually explicit understanding." For example, in Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438,
441-43 (1979) (per curiam), the Court held that a consistent state practice of admitting
attorneys to practice pro hac vice did not give rise to property interest because the interest
involved was not derived from a statute or rule, and because any understanding that ex-
isted, even if reasonable, was neither mutual nor explicit. The court expressly rejected the
theory, put forth injustice Stevens' dissent that an implicit promise could create an entitle-
ment "as if by estoppel." Id. at 444 n. 5, thereby limiting the reach of Sinderman. See
Terrell, supra note 54, at 912-18. See generally Comment, Leis v. Flynt: Retaining a Nonresident
Attorney for Litigation, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 572 (1979).
165. 408 U.S. at 603 (citation omitted). See also, e.g., Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372,
377 (9th Cir. 1983) (postponement of termination of Veterans Administration employee
after initial expiration date of appointment may have given rise to property interest in
continued employment); Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 928-30 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (repre-
sentations in FBI's employee's handbook amounted to "clearly implied promise of contin-
ued employment"). Id. at 930 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). Cf.
Fowler v. United States, 633 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1980).
166. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
167. Id. at 345.
168. Id. The relevant ordinance provided:
Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over a period of
time shall be notified in what way his work is deficient and what he must do if his
work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee fails to perform work up to
the standard of the classification held, , . . he may be dismissed by the City Man-
ager. Any discharged employee shall be given written notice of his discharge set-
ting forth the effective date and reasons for his discharge if he shall request such a
notice.
Id. at 344 n.5 (quoting MARION, N.C. PERSONNEL ORDINANCE, Art. II, § 6).
169. Id. at 347. Nor, moreover, did Bishop have a liberty interest at stake, according to
the Court, because he had not been stigmatized or foreclosed from future employment
prospects. Id. at 347-49; see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572-75 (1972).
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Once it has been determined that a specific private interest is a lib-
erty or property interest, within the meaning of the due process clause,
judicial due process analysis must address a second question: whether
minimal procedural safeguards were followed before deprivation of the
private interest. Mathews v. Eldridge adopted a balancing of private-ver-
sus-governmental interest approach.170 In the last decade the Court has
consistently applied the Mathews three-pronged balancing test' 7 1 which
maximizes judicial discretion. 172
B. Entitlement to Government Employment : Sullivan v. Stark
1. Case in Context
In Sullivan v. Stark, 17 3 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with
the dismissal of a complaint filed by Sullivan, a park ranger, against the
National Park Service for terminating his employment prior to the expi-
ration of the period specified in his employment agreement. 17 4 Sulli-
van's complaint alleged a violation of his constitutional rights because of
a refusal to give him an opportunity to answer and refute his termina-
tion, stating a deprivation of liberty and property without due process of
law. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding
that Sullivan was an "excepted service' 17 5 employee who could be dis-
charged at any time, with or without cause.
The Tenth Circuit held that (1) the termination of Sullivan by the
Park Service did not violate his liberty interest because the termination
neither damaged his reputation nor barred him from seeking other em-
ployment; (2) a public employee with a valid contract of employment for
a definite term has a property interest in employment for the duration of
the term; and (3) a government agency making an excepted service ap-
pointment has power to enter into employment contracts that confer
property rights on an employee for the duration of the contract period.
In so holding, the court reversed and remanded the case to the district
court for a determination as to whether there existed a contract for a
170. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
171. See Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979); Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17 (1978); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977).
172. In Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35, the Court indicated the following
factors should be considered in determining the "specific dictates" of due process: (1) the
private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens which the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
173. 808 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1987).
174. Id. at 739. (The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming dis-
missed the action).
175. " 'Excepted Service' employees are ordinarily considered to be 'at will' employ-
ees, and are not entitled to the statutory procedural protections against discharge ac-
corded federal employees in the competitive service." Sullivan, 808 F.2d at 740 (citing 5
U.S.C. §§ 751 l(a)(1), 7513(b)); Fowler v. United States, 633 F.2d 1258, 1260 (8th Cir.
1980).
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definite term of employment. 176
The Tenth Circuit's reversal of the district court's decision to dis-
miss Sullivan's complaint, based on the fact that he was an "excepted
service" employee, is an example of the Circuit's imposition of a high
standard of care on the government. Where the government contracts,
it will be held to the terms of the contract where the breach of that con-
tract would be a deprivation of a property interest in violation of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.
2. Statement of the Case
Sullivan was hired as a seasonal employee in the excepted service.
On May 5, 1982, he signed a "Letter of Acceptance and Employment
Agreement" with the Park Service to work as a park ranger. This agree-
ment provided that Sullivan work approximately four months, from June
8, 1982 through September 30, 1982. The employment agreement con-
tained an express provision for early termination. 177 On August 8,
1982, Sullivan was advised that his employment at Grand Teton Na-
tional Park had been terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Sulli-
van immediately demanded, but was told that he had no right to, a
hearing.
Sullivan exhausted all administrative remedies in attempting to con-
test his termination and then filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming. Sullivan contended that the employ-
ment agreement created a legitimate expectation of continued employ-
ment; that his constitutional rights were violated when the Park Service
refused to give him an opportunity to answer, refute, and contest the
alleged grounds for the termination; and that the agreement further cre-
ated the expectation that the employment would continue throughout
the term of the contract and would be terminated only for cause. The
district court dismissed the complaint and the Tenth Circuit reversed.
The case was remanded back to the district court for a determination of
whether there existed a contract based on the agreement that only bore
Sullivan's signature. A finding of a valid contract for a term would re-
quire the district court to decide what type of hearing due process
requires. i 78
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit's approach to the ex-
cepted service employee,179 and recognized the right of the individual
to contract. 180 Relying on Board of Regents v. Roth 181 the court stated
176. Sullivan, 808 F.2d at 741.
177. "I understand that due to extenuating circumstances, such as lack of funds or
other management changes, this offer of employment may be withdrawn or I may be ter-
minated before my stated ending date." Sullivan, 808 F.2d at 738.
178. Id. at 741.
179. Id. at 740.
180. See supra note 164.
181. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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that if Sullivan had a valid contract of employment for a definite term he
had a property interest, protected by procedural due process, in em-
ployment for the duration of that term.182 The Tenth Circuit saw noth-
ing prohibiting the Interior Department from contracting for a definite
term under its summer employment program but didn't know whether it
had done so.' 8 3 When the court looked at the document in the record,
it noted that it was only signed by Sullivan with no expressed reciprocal
promise of term employment by the Park Service. 184 The Tenth Circuit,
by its reference to other information furnished in a letter of employment
and a Seasonal Employee Handbook, by implication suggested that on
remand the district court should apply the standards established in Perry
v. Sindermann.i8 5 In that case the Supreme Court stated that a written
contract with an explicit tenure provision is clear evidence of a formal
understanding that supports a teacher's claim of entitlement to contin-
ued employment unless sufficient cause is shown.
As previously stated, the agreement provided that Sullivan's em-
ployment was to be effective from June 8, 1982, through September 30,
1982. When Sullivan entered into the employment agreement, he relied
on the past practice, custom and procedures of the National Park Service
in thinking that his tenure of employment would not be interrupted ex-
cept upon the,showing of sufficient cause. Even in the absence of an
express reciprocal promise by the Park Service, the district court on re-
mand could have found that there was an explicit understanding be-
tween the parties that the agreement was for a fixed term, and that
Sullivan had a reasonable expectation of continued employment
through the end of that term by the provision in the agreement.
Relying on Miller v. City of Mission,' 8 6 the Tenth Circuit had no
problem disposing of Sullivan's liberty interest claim.' 8 7 The court
found that Sullivan's reputation was not damaged because the termina-
tion was not disseminated to the public nor was he barred from seeking
other employment. 188
4. Implications of Holding
The precedential weight of this holding within the Tenth Circuit
will make it likely that where the government breaches a contract of em-
ployment for a definite term, plaintiff's property interest in employment
for the duration of the term has been offended and a hearing will be
required. This holding could have an adverse effect on the govern-
ment's reliance on employee categories when dealing with the termina-
tion of an employee, because of the weight given to an individual's right
182. See supra notes 156-165 and accompanying text.
183. Sullivan, 808 F.2d at 741.
184. Id.
185. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See supra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
186. 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983). See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see also supra
notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
187. Sullivan, 808 F.2d at 739.
188. Id. at 739.
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to contract. By implication, this holding also stands for the proposition
that a public employee's liberty interests are implicated when the rea-
sons for his discharge impugn his reputation or good name, or hinder
his freedom to seek other employment.
IV. STANDARD APPLIED TO DETERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
A. Background
1. Substantive Due Process
The, Constitution prohibits the federal government and the states
from depriving a person of "life, liberty or property without due process
of law." 189 The due process clauses traditionally have been held to pro-
vide a foundation for analyzing the adequacy of government proce-
dures. 190 In addition, apart from the procedural limitations inhering in
the concept of due process,19' the clauses have been construed to pro-
vide "substantive constitutional protection of liberty and property."'
192
This due process limit on the substance of government regulation has
come to be known as the doctrine of substantive due process.'
9 3
2. Corporal Punishment as a Violation of Substantive
Due Process
The protection of substantive due process has been used to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of statutes and regulations authorizing corpo-
ral punishment and of the discipline as administered in individual
cases. 194 The use of corporal punishment as a means of disciplining
school children has deep roots in this country. 195 It was used exten-
sively during the colonial period when the practice was justified as a Bib-
lical exhortation. 196 Corporal punishment is defined as "[pihysical
punishment as distinguished from pecuniary punishment or a fine; any
kind of punishment of or inflicted on the body." 197 Although there is a
sharp division of opinion among both educators and the general public
regarding its use, 198 corporal punishment remains an authorized
189. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV. See also supra notes 141-142 and accompanying
text.
190. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1166
(1980) [hereinafter Developments].
191. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR &J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 420 (5th ed. 1980).
192. Developments, supra note 189, at 1166; see also E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERN-
MENT (1948).
193. Developments, supra note 189, at 1166.
194. Note, Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: Constitutional Challenge After Ingraham v.
Wright?, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1978).
195. R. MNOOKIN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW (1978).
196. H. FALK, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 11-48 (1941).
197. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (5th ed. 1979).
198. See, e.g., E. BELMEIER, LEGALITY OF STUDENT DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES (1976); H.
FALK, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT (1941); J. HYMAN & J. WISE, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION (1979); K. JAMES, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(1963); S. LEVINE & E. CARY, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS 84-86 (rev. ed. 1972); National
Education Association, Report of the Task Force on Corporal Punishment (1972); B. SKIN-
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method of discipline in most public school systems. 199
In Ingraham v. Wright,20 0 the Supreme Court addressed the rights of
students in the context of public school corporal punishment. Pupils in
a Florida junior high school sought damages and injunctive relief, alleg-
ing that school officials had violated their constitutional rights by sub-
jecting them to disciplinary corporal punishment. The plaintiffs initially
based their claims on three grounds: first, corporal punishment of
schoolchildren amounts to cruel and unusual punishment; second, se-
vere corporal punishment of public school students violates fourteenth
amendment substantive due process because it is "arbitrary, capricious
and unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational goal"; and third,
the school system's policies for corporal punishment violate fourteenth
amendment due process standards by failing to provide the pupils with
any procedural safeguards before administering punishment.
20 1
Although the Court acknowledged that the punishment complained
of in Ingraham was "exceptionally harsh"2 0 2 it denied or avoided the var-
ious constitutional claims. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Powell,
20 3
the Court decided that the eighth amendment was designed to protect
persons convicted of crimes and did not apply to paddling of schoolchil-
dren. 20 4 All members of the Court agreed that the students had a four-
NER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 192-93 (1953); Reitman, Foliman, & Ladd, Corporal
Punishment in Public Schools, ACLU REPORT (1972).
199. Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1977).
200. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
201. 525 F.2d 909, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), aft'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). The
Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari on the substantive due process question. See
infra notes 260-262 and accompanying text.
202. 430 U.S. at 657. The testimony before the district court revealed the experiences
of students at the junior high school. For example, on one occasion a teacher asked some
students, including James Ingraham, to leave the stage of the school auditorium. The
students left, but were slow in doing so. Taken to the office to be paddled, James pro-
tested his innocence and refused to be hit. Aided by two other school officials who held
James, the principal hit him at least twenty times with a wooden paddle. The punishment
produced a hematoma on the buttocks; a doctor who examined James advised him to stay
home from school for at least one week.
Roosevelt Andrews, the other named plaintiff in the case, stated that one year he was
paddled at least ten times, often for being late for physical education class or for wearing
an improper gym uniform. On one occasion, paddling by the principal caused severe
swelling of his wrist and he was unable to use his arm for a week.
Another student's hand was fractured and apparently disfigured as a result of a pad-
dling. Yet another pupil accused of making an obscene telephone call to a teacher was
paddled approximately fifty times, a different child later confessed to the offense. Two
boys were struck about fifty times each for "playing hooky." One boy who had asthma and
heart trouble was hit on the back with a paddle because he wanted to clean his chair in the
auditorium before sitting down. The child had to have an operation to remove a lump that
developed where he had been struck. On two other occasions this same child vomited
blood after being paddled. Many students testified that they had been subjected to pad-
dlings for a variety of offenses, including chewing gum and not keeping their shirttails
tucked in, and also testified that administrators carried paddles and brass knuckles around
the school. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 255-59 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on rehearing,
525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
203. Justice Powell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Blackmun and Rehnquist. The dissenting opinion by Justice White was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Justice Stevens also wrote a brief dissenting opinion.
204. 430 U.S. at 664.
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teenth amendment liberty interest and that the students were
deliberately punished by restraint and the infliction of "appreciable
physical pain" by school officials acting under color of state law.2 0 5 The
majority held, however, that the availability of common law restraints
and remedies adequately satisfied the requirements of procedural due
process in protecting those liberty interests.
20 6
The Ingraham Court denied certiorari on the substantive due pro-
cess question, 20 7 which was posed broadly: "Is the infliction of severe
corporal punishment upon public school students arbitrary, capricious
and unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational purpose and
therefore violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment?" 20 8 Ingraham thus left unanswered "the substantive due process
issue of the child's own right to physical integrity." 20 9
In Hall v. Tawney, 2 10 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit became the first federal court to recognize that public
school children have a substantive due process right to ultimate bodily
security. 2 1 ' The court held that to vindicate this right, a school child
may claim federal relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983212 When specific corpo-
ral punishment exceeds in severity that which is reasonably related to
the state interest in maintaining order in the schools. 2 13 In this case a
school administrator, purportedly without provocation, struck a minor
plaintiff with a paddle made of hard rubber and about five inches in
width, across her left hip and thigh. When the plaintiff resisted, she was
shoved against a large stationary desk and was again "stricken repeat-
edly and violently" by the administrator. As a result of this application
of force the plaintiff was taken to the emergency room of a nearby hospi-
tal where she was admitted and kept for a period of ten days for treat-
ment of traumatic injury to the soft tissue of the left thigh, and trauma to
the soft tissue with ecchyniosis of the left buttock. In addition, the plain-
tiff was "receiving the treatment of specialists for possible permanent
205. Id. at 674.
206. Id. at 672, 683. For an excellent commentary on Ingraham, see Rosenberg, Ingra-
ham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 75 (1978) [hereinafter
Rosenberg].
207. 430 U.S. at 659 n.12, 679 n.47.
208: Id. at 659 n.12.
209. Rosenberg, supra note 206, at 107. Professor Rosenberg stated that "[a] princi-
pled resolution thereof.., would have required a finding that severe corporal punishment
is unconstitutional." Id. at 100.
210. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
211. Id. at 613. The substantive due process analysis has been engaged in within a
variety of contexts by lower federal courts, but has never been applied in the context of
school corporal punishment. See generally, Sewell, Conclusive Presumptions and/or Substantive
Due Process of Law', 27 OKLA. L. REv. 151, 165-71 (1974).
212. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), specifically provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute .. .subjects . . .any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
213. Hall, 621 F.2d at 611.
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injuries to her lower back and spine."'2 14
In its review of this case, the Hall panel upheld the United States
District Court's dismissal of the cruel and unusual punishment claim and
the procedural due process allegation; however, it overruled that court's
dismissal of the substantive due process complaint. 2 15 Although recog-
nizing that the Ingraham Court had refused to review a claim that exces-
sive corporal punishment violated a right to substantive due process, the
Fourth Circuit determined that the availability of state civil and criminal
remedies did not preclude a federal cause of action under section 1983
when rights to substantive due process might be implicated. 2 16 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that school children have a right to ultimate
bodily security based on substantive due process and set forth the fol-
lowing test to determine whether the right has been violated:
... the substantive due process inquiry in school corporal pun-
ishment cases must be whether the force applied caused injury
so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and
was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely care-
less or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and
inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the
conscience.
2 17
In Rochin v. Cahfornia,21 s the Supreme Court held that the forced
pumping of a suspect's stomach was a clear violation of fourteenth
amendment due process because it "shocks the conscience,
' 2 19
although it was the only means of obtaining the criminal evidence that
the police sought. 220 The Court indicated that an individual's interest
in freedom from bodily intrusion is a fundamental interest. In finding
that the treatment violated the due process clause, Justice Frankfurter
recognized that the clause protected "personal immunities" that are
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
'22 1
3. Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity
Most corporal punishment cases are litigated in state courts under
charges of battery,2 22 or assault and battery;2 2 3 however, an increasing
214. Id. at 614.
215. Id. at 615.
216. Id. at 611. The Court had held the allegations sufficient to state a claim for relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and further held that the episodic nature of the punishment did
not preclude the federal action. Id. at 614-15.
217. Id. at 613. The Hall panel acknowledged that the Supreme Court, in Ingraham,
had ruled that school paddlings violated neither procedural due process nor eighth
amendment rights, and that since neither of these two rights were violated it might be
possible to imply a holding that neither could there be a violation of any substantive due
process right. Id. at 611. However, the Hall panel reasoned that the implication was not
compelled due to the Supreme Court's express reservation of the issue.
218. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
219. Id. at 172. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954), limited Rochin to situa-
tions involving coercion, violence, or brutality to the person.
220. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-9 (1978).
221. 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Cardozo, J., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
222. People v. Ball, 58 Ill.2d 36, 317 N.E.2d 54 (1974).
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number of litigants are bringing actions in federal court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.224 This federal law allows a plaintiff whose civil rights have
been violated by state officials, to bring a constitutional tort or equity
action in federal court against such officials 22 5 or the governmental
agency that employs the individuals accused of committing the civil
wrong.
Many individuals who claim that their civil rights have been violated
prefer to seek damages in federal court under section 1983 primarily
because federal law prevents school districts and other municipal agen-
cies from claiming immunity under existing state law for the civil rights
violations committed by employees. 2 26 However, qualified immunity,
also known as the good faith defense, generally protects a public official
from liability if he can prove he acted in "good faith.
'" 22 7
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,22 8 the Supreme Court significantly changed
the basis for establishing the defense of qualified immunity in section
1983 actions. Under the Harlow test, government officials "generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." 2 29 The decision eliminated the
subjective considerations that were enunciated in Wood v. Strickland.
2 30
Determination of qualified immunity is now to be based "on the objec-
tive reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to
clearly established law."
'2 3 1
B. Constitutional Implications of Corporal Punishment in Public Schools:
Garcia v. Miera
1. Case in Context
Garcia v. Miera2 32 involved the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' re-
223. Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954).
224. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
225. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Traditionally, defendants had their
conduct tested against both an "objective" and a "subjective" standard. See Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). However, Harlow dispensed with the subjective element
and held that the defendant is not liable under § 1983, so long as his official actions do not
violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." 457 U.S. at 818.
226. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). In this case, the Supreme
Court held that when a public body is subject to liability, it cannot assert an immunity
based on the good faith of its officers as a defense even though the officials themselves
might assert such a defense when they are sued individually.
227. See generally, Note, Eleventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Civil Rights, 61 DEN. U.L.
REV. 163, 165-66 (1984) (discussing the distinction between the subjective and objective
test, as applied by the Tenth Circuit).
The defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in good
faith. S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 8.01 (1979).
228. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
229. Id. at 818.
230. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See supra notes 235 and 237 and accom-
panying text.
231. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
232. 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987).
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view of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico's
grant of summary judgment. The district court found that the school
officials involved in the two incidents of corporal punishment were insu-
lated from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983233 by qualified immunity.
Teresa Garcia, an elementary school pupil at the Penasco Elemen-
tary School in New Mexico, by her parents and best friends Max and
Sandra Garcia, sued the school officials in their individual capacities for
denying her substantive due process in violation of section 1983 arising
from two beatings suffered at their hands. 23 4 The district court granted
summary judgment to the school district, concluding that it was shielded
from liability by the defense of good faith immunity23 5 because "the law
governing whether excess corporal punishment can give rise to a sub-
stantive due process claim [was] not clearly established." ' 236 Garcia ap-
pealed the district court's grant of summary judgment contending that
at the time of the beatings excessive corporal punishment by school offi-
cials did violate her clearly established substantive due process rights.
In reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit referred
to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Ingraham v. Wright,
2 3 7
where the Court declared that "corporal punishment in public schools
implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest."
23 8
2. Statement of the Case
Teresa Garcia was a grammar school student at the Penasco Ele-
mentary School, Penasco, New Mexico in 1982 and 1983. On February
10, 1982, Theresa Miera, the school principal, summoned Garcia, then
in the third grade, to her office to punish her for hitting a boy who had
kicked her. Miera attempted to paddle Garcia, but she refused to coop-
erate, resulting in Miera's calling J.D. Sanchez, a teacher at the school,
for assistance. Sanchez grabbed Garcia's ankles and held her upside
down while Miera hit her leg with the paddle. 2 39 The beating made a
two inch cut on Garcia's leg that left a permanent scar. Shortly after this
incident, Garcia's parents voiced their concerns to Miera and requested
that they be notified in the event their daughter was to be subjected to
corporal punishment again.
Garcia received a second beating about one and one-half years later
when she was summoned to Miera's office for saying she had seen a
teacher, Judy Mestas, kissing a student's father, Denny Mersereas, dur-
ing a field trip. Garcia also said that Mestas had sent love letters to Mer-
sereas through his son. 240 After suffering two blows with the paddle,
233. See § 1983, supra note 212 and accompanying text.
234. Garcia, 817 F.2d at 652.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
238. Id. at 672.
239. The paddle "was split right down the middle, so it was two pieces, and when it hit,
it clapped [and] grabbed." Garcia, 817 F.2d at 653.
240. Id. at 653, see also n.3.
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Garcia refused to receive the remaining three and asked permission to
telephone her parents. Miera refused to allow Garcia to phone her par-
ents until the paddling was completed. Miera then called Edward Leyba,
an administrative associate at the school, to assist her in delivery of the
remaining three blows. Leyba assisted by pushing Garcia towards a
chair over which she was to bend and receive the last three blows. Gar-
cia and Leyba struggled and Garcia hit her back on Miera's desk. She
then submitted to the last three blows. Garcia suffered back pains for
several weeks as a result thereof.
Garcia received medical treatment for multiple and severe bruises
to her buttocks she sustained from the second paddling. Dr. Albrecht,
M.D., the attending physician, stated, "I've done hundreds of physicals
of children who have had spankings . . . and I have not seen bruises on
the buttocks as Teresita had, from routine spankings . . . [T]hey were
more extensive, deeper bruises .... ,,241 The examining nurse, Betsy
Martinez, testified that if a child received such injuries by a parent's
hand, she would be obligated to notify protective services.
24 2
Garcia alleged that the severity of the paddlings violated her sub-
stantive due process rights. Miera, defendant-appellee, based her mo-
tion for summary judgment on the fact that the law concerning
substantive due process rights of school children subjected to corporal
punishment was not clearly established, entitling them to good faith
immunity.
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach to substan-
tive due process in Ingraham, aligning itself with the Fourth Circuit on
this crucial issue. In Hall v. Tawney, 24 3 the Fourth Circuit indicated that
the infliction of corporal punishment by a public school official may vio-
late a schoolchild's constitutional rights. The court determined that
"there may be circumstances under which specific corporal punishment
administered by state school officials gives rise to an independent fed-
eral cause of action to vindicate substantive due process rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983."244 Although the test Hall proposed for determining a
due process violation is extremely stringent, the decision provides a
framework for the analysis of the substantive due process rights of stu-
dents subjected to excessive physical punishment. In coming to its con-
clusion, the Hall court went beyond the scope of Ingraham, in which the
Supreme Court expressly reserved the issue of substantive due
process.
24 5
Ingraham made clear that reasonable corporal punishment violated
241. Garcia, 817 F.2d at 653.
242. Id.
243. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980). See also Milonas v. William, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983) (the use of excessive physical force may violate
schoolchildrens' constitutional rights).
244. 621 F.2d at 611.
245. Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651, 659 n.12.
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no substantive due process rights of school children. 24 6 The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that by acknowledging that "corporal punishment implicates a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause," In-
graham clearly signaled that, at some degree of excessiveness or cruelty,
the meting out of such punishment violates the substantive due process
rights of the pupils.
24 7
Because the Tenth Circuit had addressed the issue of excessive cor-
poral punishment of a student in Milonas v. Williams,2 48 it decided that
the law was clearly established at the time of the second beating. By
relying on Harlow's objective test of what a reasonable person would
have known, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the split between the Fifth
and the Fourth Circuits, but stated that the Supreme Court when it ad-
dressed the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ingraham, indicated that corporal
punishment in public schools is a constitutionally protected right.
4. Implications of Holding
Although the Supreme Court in Ingraham foreclosed section 1983
actions based on the eighth amendment or procedural due process, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that corporal punishment could violate sub-
stantive due process and hence serve as a basis for federal relief under
section 1983. The Garcia court's recognition of the right to ultimate
bodily security as a matter of substantive due process provides review in
federal courts of the conduct of public school officials. The Tenth Cir-
cuit has helped clear the way for the Supreme Court to declare severe
corporal punishment of schoolchildren a violation of substantive due
process.
CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit balanced the right of
the individual with that of the governmental interest. Jn Phelps v. Reagan,
the Tenth Circuit had to decide if the first amendment was a limitation
on the President's power to appoint ambassadors. The court decided
that the case was foreclosed by the political question doctrine but not
before it addressed the standing issue, determining that Flast and Valley
Forge were still the precedent in the area of the first amendment estab-
lishment clause cases. In Mini Spas v. Salt Lake City Corp., the court was
also faced with a first amendment claim, freedom of expression. Here
the court determined that massage parlor's interest in freedom of ex-
pression was outweighed by the city's interest in regulating their dress
so as to prevent the parlors from degenerating into houses of prostitu-
tion. In Sullivan v. Stark, the Tenth Circuit required the government to
comply with due process requirements. The court stated that it saw no
reason why the government could not enter into employment contracts
246. Id. at 676.
247. Garcia, 817 F.2d at 654.
248. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982).
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- having so contracted - it was bound to the terms of such contract
because there is a property interest in employment. In Garcia v. Miera,
the Tenth Circuit found a substantive due process right of students in
public schools in the area of corporal punishment. In an area of confu-
sion among the circuits and faced with silence from the Supreme Court,
the Tenth Circuit pioneered the field for the Supreme Court to adopt a
substantive due process standard in the area of corporal punishment.
Although the Tenth Circuit swung back and forth between the individ-
ual's rights and the governmental interest in the areas of procedural and
substantive due process, its overall approach was well-balanced.
Boston H. Stanton, Jr.
